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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ATromy-Cumr PRIVxLEGE-CONTEmPT: THE DmFMmA iN NON-
DiscLosuRE OF PossIBLY PRIVILEGED INFo1.MAmN.-Dike v. Dike,
75 Wash. Dec. 2d 1, 448 P.2d 490 (1968).*
I. THE ATTORNEY'S DILEMMA
The scope of the privilege protecting confidential commumcations
between an attorney and his client is determined by judicial and legis-
lative balancing of our legal system's fundamental desire to ascertain
the truth by consideration of all relevant evidence, and the basic need
to foster free disclosure of information between clients and attorneys.
Because the scope of this privilege m a particular jurisdiction is not
always clearly defined,' the privilege is often erroneously asserted by
attorneys or improperly deied by judges.
The attorney is both an officer of the court and an advocate sworn
to protect hIs client's confidence,' and when he is ordered to disclose
information which is arguably privileged, he faces a dilemma. He must
either disclose the information, with resultant harm to his client, or
withhold it and risk imprisonment or fine for contempt. The Ethics
Committee of the American Bar Association has advised that it is not
unethical for an attorney to resolve doubts about possibly privileged
matter m favor of non-disclosure; 3 the attorney may thus place his
*For a parallel, yet variant, student analysis of this aspect of the attorney-client
privilege see Comment, The Attorney-Client Prnvilege: The Remedy of Contempt,
1968 Wis. L. REv. 1192.
'Quotation of but one classic statement of the scope of the attorney-client privilege
verifies the potentiality for uncertainty*
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought
to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a)
is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with
this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact
of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of
strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion of law or
(ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the
purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed
and (b) not waived by the client.
Wyzanski, J. in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-
59 (D. Mass. 1950). Judge Wyzanski's exposition also makes clear that the attorney-
client privilege is a rather narrow and circumscribed concept-although not so narrow
as to remove room for legitimate dispute as to its applicability in a particular case.
'ABA CANONS OF P OFEssIoNAL ETHIcs Nos. 1 & 37.
'ABA CoMMa. ON PaOFESsoNAL ETHIcs, OPINIONS, No. 216 (1941).
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duty as an advocate before his duty to the bench,4 even when the
court can impose a jail sentence.5
The courts, however, apply a different standard.6 In some jurisdic-
tions refusal to obey a "lawful" order-one issued by a court having
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter-is punishable as
contempt.7 Any defiance of a "lawful" order to disclose possibly priv-
ileged matter is contempt, even if on appeal the order is held to have
been erroneous. Other jurisdictions afford the non-complying attorney
a "gambling chance" of escaping punishment when the information
sought is possibly privileged.8 If the appellate court rules that the
'ABA CoMaI. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 287 (1953).
'ABA Com. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINION, No. 312 as reported in
ABA, OPINIONS ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS at 171 (1967).
This opinion has been superseded by the American Bar Association's new Code of
Professional Responsibility. ABA, SPECIAL Comm. ON EVALUATION OF ETHICAL STAN-
DARDS, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Final Draft, July 1, 1969). Canon 4
provides that: "A lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client." Id.
at 51. However, Disciplinary Rule 4-101 (C) states:
A lawyer may reveal:
(2) Confidences or secrets when . . . required by law or court order.
Disciplinary Rule 4-101 (A) defines "Confidence" as "information protected by the
attorney-client privilege under applicable law .... " The new Code thus clearly permits
an attorney to disclose under court order information which he believes to be within
the ambit of the attorney-client privilege. See also Ethical Consideration 4-4.
The Code of Professional Responsibility was approved at the 1969 American Bar
Association Convention in Dallas, Texas. Until adopted by a given jurisdiction, however,
it is not effective there. As of this time, Washington has not adopted the Code.
'The discussion in this note is limited to the area of civil direct contempt, i.e., civil
contempts in the "immediate presence of the court," which are punished summarily.
In a summary proceeding, the accused is not entitled to such procedural protections
as adjudication by an impartial tribunal and a jury trial, even though the defendant
may be incarcerated for a period up to six months. See In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224,
227 (1945). See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.20.020-.030 (1956).
The distinction between civil and criminal contempt has never been satisfactorily
delineated, particularly in light of the broad statutory definitions the courts must work
with. Traditionally, criminal contempt lies for that conduct which affronts the dignity
of the court and the legal process, while civil contempt lies for passive non-compliance
with a court's orders to the detriment of private parties. The distinction is not in the
sanction imposed, but rather in the purpose of the sanction. See, R. GOLDFARB, THE
CONTEMPT POWER, 47-67 (1963) for a thorough discussion of the fruitless attempts
at developing a clear distinction between the two concepts.
See also, Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) in which the U.S. Supreme Court
held that in certain situations the Sixth Amendment guarantees a jury trial to crim-
inal contempt defendants.
'See, e.g., Ex Parte Libscomb, 111 Tex. 409, 239 S.W. 1101 (1922). See also, 8 3.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2321 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
'See, e.g., Ex Parte Enzor, 270 Ala. 254, 117 So. 2d 361 (1960); Robertson v. Com-
monwealth, 181 Va. 520, 25 S.E.2d 352, 146 A.L.R. 966 (1943); Appeal of United States
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 226 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1955).
This rule was adopted by the Washington court in Dike v. Dike, 75 Wash. Dec. 2d
1, 448 P.2d 490 (1968). See note 11 and accompanying text infra.
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order was erroneous, the contempt conviction is reversed; but if it
finds no error, the contempt conviction stands. Such divergent stan-
dards among the courts and the bar may place the attorney in a quan-
dry as to the proper response to an order to disclose.
A recent Washington case examines the attorney's dilemma. In Dike
v. Dike,9 the Washington Supreme Court reviewed a summary con-
tempt conviction imposed upon an attorney for refusing to reveal the
whereabouts of his client, the defendant in a pending divorce action.
The client had removed her daughter from the temporary court-
awarded custody of a third party, and would not return the child.
Having failed to answer a motion to hold his client in contempt for
violating the custody order, the attorney was directed to appear, and
either produce the defendant or show cause why he could not produce
her. The attorney appeared, but refused to divulge his client's where-
abouts, contending that the information was privileged and that dis-
closure would violate the Canons of Professional Ethics. The court
then instructed a deputy sheriff to handcuff the attorney and remove
him to the county jail. After being fingerprinted, booked and photo-
graphed, the attorney was released on $5000 bail.
On appeal the Washington Supreme Court held that the order to
disclose was neither unlawful nor erroneous."0 Ordinarily, such deter-
minations would suffice to uphold the contempt conviction under either
of the previously discussed rules for review." The Washington court,
however, vacated the contempt order and absolved the attorney from
further punishment.
In assessing the wisdom of the attorney's choice, the court expressed
075 Wash. Dec. 2d 1, 448 P.2d 490 (1968).
'"The Court held that Washington's statutory privilege and the privilege embodied
in Canon 37 are merely a restatement of the common law and under the common law,
the court has the right to compel an attorney to disclose the whereabouts of his client
when the following conditions have been met: the attorney must have appeared in the
action in which the address is sought; the attorney-client relationship must still exist;
the attorney's client must have been a party to the action; the action must still be
pending; the address must not be sought for the purpose of pursuing the client in
subsequent litigation; and the information must be necessary to protect the rights of
an innocent third party. This right to compel disclosure is recognized as an exception
to the attorney-client privilege, founded on the necessity to protect the public interest,
an interest that weighed more heavily in the instant case than the public good gained
by preserving the attorney-client privilege. 75 Wash. Dec. 2d 1, 10, 13, 448 P.2d 490,
496, 497-98 (1968).
n See notes 7 & 8 and accompanying text supra. The Washington Court adopted the
"gambling chance" rule for review of contempt convictions for asserting a privilege.
75 Wash. Dec. 2d at 7-10, 448 P.2d at 494-96.
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empathy for the "damned if you do, darned if you don't" position in
which the superior court judge had placed the attorney, and recognized
that the dilemma was compounded by the fact that this particular
privilege issue had never been decided in Washington. After contrast-
ing these considerations with the severity of the sanction imposed, the
supreme court ruled that it was an abuse of discretion to order more
than pro forma detention of an attorney, acting in good faith with
respect to an unsettled privilege issue.
The result in Dike-that is, vacation of the conviction as well as
absolution from further punishment-may be interpreted in two ways.
Dike can be read to hold that this attorney's conduct was not con-
temptuous, and that erroneous defiance of a judicial order to disclose
is not contempt when the relevant privilege issue is unsettled. Alterna-
tively, the case might simply mean that sentencing for contempt must
not be unreasonable. Under either reading, the court has only fleetingly
resolved the ethical dilemma, for it did not establish any guidelines to
assist attorneys faced with similar predicaments in the future.
Dike not only leaves the attorney to face without guidance the vex-
atious ethical dilemma of whether or not to submit to an order to dis-
close possibly privileged information; it also leaves unalleviated the
most serious and fundamental problem arising out of such dilemmas:
namely, judicial dilution of the client's right to have confidential dis-
closures to his attorney withheld from public scrutiny.
II. DILUTION OF THE CLIENT'S PRIVILEGE
In the traditional view, the attorney-client privilege is necessary to
enable the attorney to represent his client to the best of his abilities.' -
But in present operation, the effectiveness of the privilege is diluted,
directly and indirectly.
Direct dilution results from the common application of a "judicial
presumption" against the attorney-client privilege. Courts are in almost
unanimous agreement that, since this privilege operates to exclude
otherwise relevant and material evidence, it must be strictly con-
strued. 3 In cases for which the applicability of the attorney-client
'See generally Gardner, A Re-evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 8 VraL.
L. REV. 279, 447 (1963); and 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
"38 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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privilege is unsettled, the existence of a judicial presumption against
the privilege is likely to result in an order to disclose, and the order
is likely to induce compliance by the uncertain attorney. Even if the
order is appealed, it is apt to be upheld by the application of this rule
of strict construction. The consequence in any event is a significant
direct dilution of the scope and effectiveness of the client's privilege.
Indirect dilution of the attorney-client privilege is a natural conse-
quence of the Dike dilemma. In the Dike situation an attorney must
consider not only his duty to obey the court and his duty to preserve
his client's privilege, but also the relative consequences of failure to
fulfill these duties. As a result of the gross disparity between the sanc-
tions available to the court and the remedies available to the client
only in rare instances will an attorney defy a court to protect his
client's privilege. The court wields the immediate and ignominious
sanction of contempt. 4 Aside from the threat of fine and imprison-
ment,15 a contempt conviction may also prompt disciplinary action by
the local bar association."6 The client, however, is essentially without
remedy. No appellate case has been found in which a client has recov-
ered from his attorney for improper disclosure under judicial order of
privileged information. Nor does there appear to be any instance of
censure or disbarment for such conduct.17 If the attorney complies with
the court order, he has little to fear in the way of retributive action by
"See Keller v. Keller, 52 Wn. 2d 84, 86-88, 323 P.2d 231, 232-33 (1958) for a good
discussion of the Washington court's statutory and inherent contempt power. See also
Ex Parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1873).
'See, e.g., WAsH. REv. CODE § 7.20.020 (1956) which allows a judge to impose a
punishment of imprisonment for up to six months and a fine of up to three hundred
dollars; and WASH. REv. CODE § 7.20.110 (1957) which allows a judge to imprison a
recalcitrant witness until he discloses the information sought.
"Although local bar associations may vary in their treatment of contempt citations,
it is this writer's understanding that most such organizations at least review all con-
tempt citations to decide if disciplinary action is warranted. Review and discipline for
wilful disobedience of a court order is authorized in Washington. WASH. REv. CODE
§ 2.48.220(2) (1957); WASH. Disc. R. AT=y. III. B.
"The Code of Professional Responsibility recently adopted by the American Bar
Association explicitly permits an attorney to disclse possibly privileged matter under
court order, apparently removing any possibility of censure or disbarment wherever it
is in effect. DR 4-101 (C) (2), ABA, SPECIAL Comm. ON EVALuATION OF ETHICAL STAN-
DARDS, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmLrrY (Final Draft, July 1, 1969) dis-
cussed note 5 supra. The position of the American Bar Association is understandable
given the potentially harsh consequences of a contempt conviction, but query whether
the resolution of the attorney's dilemma has not been resolved at the expense of the
client now that express sanction has been given to the sacrifice of the client's possible
right to non-disclosure under the attorney-client privilege. It must be pointed out, how-
ever, that DR 4-101 (C)(2) does not prohibit an attorney from refusing to divulge
what he believes to be privileged material.
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his client, and, in the absence of such a factor, he cannot help but feel
compelled to submit to the order to disclose rather than to face the
potentially harsh consequences of being held in contempt.1 8 The ulti-
mate result is that the attorney may be inclined to divulge information
privileged in fact which his client has communicated to him in reliance
on the effectiveness of the privilege.
III. DISCLOSURE AND IRREPARABLE INJURY
The client's privilege is narrowed because of the tendency of attor-
neys to submit to an order to disclose rather than risk punishment for
contempt. Privileged information may be revealed even though the
client may have very substantial reasons for desiring that it be kept
confidential. The communicated matter may be damaging to his suc-
cess in the particular action before the court; or it may be collaterally
damaging, subjecting him to possible liability in another action or in-
juring his reputation." The exact nature of the damage, as well as the
type of proceeding and the client's relationship to it, has a strong
bearing on whether a cure is available for the harm resulting from the
disclosure of privileged information.
When the client is a party in a formal trial setting, he has the rem-
edy of an appeal from an adverse judgment. Where the information
disclosed is injurious only in the case at hand and has no potential for
collateral damage, this remedy will ordinarily be adequate. If the in-
formation is in fact privileged, reversal of the order to disclose will
cure the harm of an unfavorable lower court outcome-unless the
added expense of appeal and retrial outweighs the value of the action,
or unless the appellate court applies a rule of harmless error and holds
that, although the information was privileged, its disclosure was not
'This contention is supported by the scarcity of contempt appeals based on an asser-
tion of the attorney-client privilege amidst an abundance of appeals by clients claiming
wrongful denial of the privilege. This writer has found only four cases in which an
attorney has appealed a contempt conviction for refusal to disclose privileged communi-
cations-Dike v. Dike, 75 Wash. Dec. 2d 1, 448 P.2d 490 (1968); United States v. Kovel,
296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961); Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960); Appeal
of United States Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 226 F.2d 501 (6th Cir. 1955). See also In re
Buckey, 395 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1968) in which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
refused to review a privilege ruling on the grounds that the appeal was interlocutory.
"See Gardner, A Re-evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 8 VirL. L. REV.
279, 337-38 (1963) for a discussion of what the author terms the "hard core" area of
the privilege-those items "which the client would intend that his lawyer should never
reveal to anyone."
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substantially prejudicial.20 However, when the improperly disclosed
information does have potential for collateral injury to the client, his
right to appeal is clearly not an adequate remedy. For example, in a
suit on a contract, a court might require the defendant's attorney to
reveal certain information about his client's financial records, even
though such information might subject the client to liability in a sub-
sequent proceeding for tax evasion. Once such information is disclosed,
reversal as to the client's contractual liability would be of no help in
avoiding civil and criminal tax liability.
In less formal courtroom settings, such as the judicial hearing in
Dike, or in a grand jury investigation where the investigating body
can utilize direct summary contempt power,2 the client is without rem-
edy. He is unable to appeal as there is no final adjudication of rights;
and even if an appeal procedure were available, any collateral damage
caused by the disclosure would not be curable.
Finally, when the client is not a party to the action, and his attorney
divulges possibly privileged information, he is again without remedy.
A non-party has no right to review and nothing to gain by review; he
cannot even obtain a determination of whether or not the disclosed
information is privileged.
The net result of the tendency of attorneys to submit to judicial
orders to disclose is that in situations where an appeal is unavailable
or is an unsatisfactory remedy, privileged communications, which are
theoretically "protected by law", are irreparably disclosed without any
waiver by the client, and with little regard for the interests of the
client, to whom the privilege belongs.2 Courts occasionally express
dissatisfaction with the conventional approach; 3 yet they have been
' An erroneous ruling by the trial court on the question of privilege will only result
in reversible error if the privileged communication elicited results in substantial harm
to the rights of a party. In other words, when the record on appeal will support the
judgment without the privileged information, an appellate court will not reverse. It
is not difficult to visualize a situation in which the trial court will regard a particular
communication as crucial and the appellate court will not reverse because the infor-
mation, although privileged, was in its view not necessary to support the judgment.
See, e.g., In re Quick's Estate, 161 Wash. 537, 297 P. 198 (1931); Conerly v. Lewis,
238 Aiss. 68, 117 So. 2d 460 (1960) ; Food Fair Stores v. Howard, - Del. -, 212 A.2d
405 (1965).
'See, e.g., In re Buckey, 395 F.2d 388 (6th Cir. 1968).
'See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVmIDcc §§ 2321, 2327 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
'See Appeal of the United States Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 226 F.2d 801, 507 (6th Cir.
1955) in which a district judge is quoted as saying "They (the attorney-witnesses) were
in a difficult situation. They had to choose between two courses of action. They could
obey the court and disobey the Commission, which might result in their losing their
187
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deterred from fashioning a solution by a recognition of the dangers in
allowing attorneys to decide for themselves even the narrow legal ques-
tions in the area of the attorney-client privilege, 4 and also by an
awareness of the necessity for efficient and orderly disposition of judi-
cial business.
IV. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
Any solution must allow the attorney adequate insulation from the
stigma of contempt when he asserts the privilege in good faith, at least
until there has been a final adjudication of the privilege issue. The
most rational protection would be some form of interlocutory appeal,
accompanied by an emergency stay of proceedings. 2' Although the
Sixth Circuit recently rejected this device, 26 requiring instead that the
attorney appeal his contempt conviction, the various states are free to
implement such an interlocutory appeal procedure by statute.
The operation of such an interlocutory appeal can be best exam-
ined in the formal trial setting. A showing of possible collateral injury
for which the normal appeal affords no remedy would be required in
order to obtain an emergency stay of the order to disclose. The sole
function of the trial judge would be to decide this issue after argument
in chambers 2S-the closed hearing being essential to avoid the very
jobs permanently, or they could obey the Commission and disobey the court and thus
lose their freedom temporarily. I don't know which course would be the wiser for
them to follow. It may be that a temporary loss of freedom would be less of a loss than
a permanent loss of a civil service job."
'See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1953).
-28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964) allows interlocutory appeals in federal district courts
where "controlling questions of law," determination of which may materially advance
the ultimate disposition of the litigation, are at stake. Unfortunately, the federal courts
have generally held that questions of privilege do not fall within this statute. United
States v. Woodbury, 263 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1959). But see Radiant Burners, Inc. v.
Am. Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963) in which the district judge allowed a
§ 1292(b) appeal on the question of whether the attorney-client privilege applied to
corporations.
'In Re Buckey, 395 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1968). In this case, an attorney, faced with
an order to disclose in a district court, obtained an emergency stay of proceedings and
sought an appeal of that order. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to review
the order either as an appeal or as a request for a mandatory writ.
Some states have a general interlocutory appeal procedure patterned after 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) (1964). See, e.g., UTAH R. Civ. P. 72(b). The only major difference is in the
fact that the state statutes give the appellate court the discretion to decide whether the
appeal should be granted. The federal statute leaves the question of certification to the
trial judge.
'Although this solution still contemplates some discretion in the trial judge, there
is authority for the use of a writ of mandamus to compel a trial judge to certify a
188
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collateral damage which the procedure is designed to prevent. If a
showing of potential collateral injury is made, the application for an
interlocutory appeal wduld be required to be heard by an appellate
court within a limited time period. The appeal would be discretionary,
under certiorari or some similar method, and would only be allowed
when, in the opinion of the appellate court, a meritorious privilege
question is presented. If the interlocutory appeal is denied, the emer-
gency stay of the trial court proceedings would be dissolved, and the
sole remedy for an order to disclose or a contempt conviction would
be a normal appeal. If the interlocutory appeal is granted, the emer-
gency stay would be continued, and the privilege issue would be fully
briefed, argued, and decided; the appellate opinion would be the law
of the case and res judicata so that the appealing attorney could not
raise the issue again, either on remand or in a subsequent direct appeal.
The attorney's dilemma would be resolved: if the interlocutory rul-
ing is favorable, disclosure could not be compelled; but, if it is adverse,
disclosure would be required. Furthermore, this solution would be at-
tained with a minimum of delay. Privilege issues without merit and
those involving no possibility of collateral injury would be rapidly re-
solved. The only significant delay would occur in the case of a privilege
issue both meritorious and with potential for collateral injury; this
delay is amply justified by the elimination of the attorney's dilemma
when faced with a judicial order to disclose information which he
believes to be within the attorney-client privilege.
The interlocutory appeal procedure need not be restricted to the
formal trial setting. It could be employed also in the less formal set-
tings such as hearings and grand jury investigations. However, a de-
sire for greater dispatch in those other types of proceedings might mil-
itate against the use of the procedure. This special appeal process
could even be employed when the client is not a party to the proceed-
ing, although delay of a proceeding by a non-party is subject to ques-
tion. As to each situation, the advisability of adoption would depend
on the balancing of the costs of the attorney's dilemma against the
extent and nature of the necessitated delay.
The interlocutory appeal procedure, by eliminating the attorney's
question of law for appeal. See Ex Parte Deepwater Exploration Co., 260 F.2d 546
(5th Cir. 1958) in which a writ of mandamus issued to compel a district judge to
certify an appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964).
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dilemma, would also arrest the indirect dilution of the client's privilege.
By providing an effective alternative to disclosure, it would permit
the attorney to contest a potentially erroneous order to disclose with-
out fear of contempt. No longer would an attorney have to sacrifice
his client's privilege in order to avoid a contempt conviction. However,
the direct dilution arising out of the judicial presumption against the
application of the attorney-client privilege would remain.
All of the principals in an attorney-client privilege controversy
would benefit if the attorney, when necessary, could obtain interlocu-
tory relief without having to wait to appeal a contempt conviction. The
attorney would be free to assert his client's rights without fear of
penalty; the judge would be pleased to have the privilege question an-
swered without having to resort to contempt power; and, most impor-
tantly, the client would not only avoid the potentiality of irreparable
injury due to unnecessary disclosure of privileged information, but
would also profit greatly from a revitalization of the attorney-client
privilege.
190
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